This is a link to an op-ed published in the Salt Lake Tribune, June 21, 2008 and to be published in the East Valley Tribune, June 22, 2008 that I have co-authored with Dan Barr of Perkins Coie Brown and Bain proposing the establishment of a US domestic terror court. The proposal, based on my testimony earlier this month before the Senate Judiciary Committee, is written in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene.
I regret that my post is delayed somewhat by travel. I am at present writing from Venice, en route to which I had occasion to do more thinking about the implications of Boumediene than I did for detailed dissection of its precise phraseology. The fortuity of my presence overseas allows me to report the prevailing media spin that Boumediene represents a reestablishment of American law and a repudiation of the U.S. military acting as “jailor, judge, and jury.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt captured the essence of the moral struggle to preserve the American way of life in World War II by telling the nation that “the mighty action we are fighting for cannot be based on a disregard of all things worth fighting for.” The struggle to refine the optimal balance between the president’s duty to “preserve, protect, and defend” the constitution and the executive obligation to protect American lives and property may very well be the most enduring question of our time. At its heart, Boumediene rests on the straightforward legal determination by the Court that the Suspension Clause applies to the detainees in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay, followed by the rather predictable conclusion that the circumstances motivating the Congressional deprivation of habeas rights to the detainees did not rise to those specified in the constitution itself. Viewed in the stark terms portrayed in the media, the case can be seen as a validation of essential conditions of human liberty against the exercise of raw governmental power. Given that a president who disagrees with the court’s conclusions has publicly stated that he will nevertheless comply with its opinion, Boumediene does represent all that is best about an America dedicated to law and the preservation of life and liberty.
At the same time, there is a vaguely disquieting dimension to the Boumediene decision. The heart of the majority analysis relies on the assumption that the present system of Combatant Status Review Tribunals combined with the oversight and remedial powers of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is inadequate to protect the essential human liberty of the detainees. The factual record indicates otherwise given that far more detainees have been released from Guantanamo than are currently in custody, and the current procedures provide both for periodic individualized reviews as well as a new CSRT when evidence surfaces that could result in a reversal of a previously determined status. By sheer coincidence, the Secretary of Defense recently ordered a new CSRT for Haji Bismullah on the basis of new evidence that could lead to his release. Because the Secretary’s request rendered the prior CSRT a non-final decision, the Solicitor General subsequently requested that the Court remand Bismullah’s case from its pending decision in Gates v. Bismullah. http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/sg-letter-re-bismullah-5-8-08.pdf
Although Justice Souter postulates the necessity for the majority opinion on the truism that “some of these petitioners have spent six years behind bars,” the evidence is that the system is indeed working to release those who do not pose a continuing threat to American interests and citizens. Furthermore, the majority establishes constitutional habeas rights, even as it acknowledges that an Article III process will not foreclose further confinement for future petitioners on the sole basis of a hostile status.
I do not believe that the Court intended its Boumediene reasoning to be read as automatically requiring release of any of the present detainees who do represent a continuing threat to the American constitutional order. The decision nevertheless contains the seeds for profoundly troubling extrapolations. For example, if the requirement for a “competent tribunal” found in Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention is distorted in the future to mean an established Article III court, then the hands of the military would be bound with devastatingly deleterious effects on military operations overseas. The negotiating record for the Geneva Conventions and the official Commentary are both clear that the phrase “competent tribunal” was specifically negotiated to be much more operationally flexible than the preexisting domestic court systems. Boumediene cannot be properly read as applying in the context of an international armed conflict wherein the clear mandates of the Geneva Conventions have been applied.
Finally, while Boumediene is portrayed as somewhat inspiring and idealistic, there is a troubling disconnect in its pragmatic implications. In practical terms the majority candidly admits that its decision “does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.” I am struck by the immense disconnect between the moral certainty with which the court creates a substantive right that can be gleaned neither from the law of armed conflict nor from any clear precedent, but at the same time creates such enormous uncertainty and moral confusion. There are more than a few federal judges who are today beginning to ponder some of the following important questions as cases begin to be filed: What are the standards of review? Does the voice of military expertise get ANY deference? Are the previous findings of CSRT panels to be completely discounted as if they were mere martinets in the hands of an overweening chief executive? Can any evidence that would be inadmissible hearsay if a specific petitioner were charged criminally provide the basis for continuing detention? What are the limits of the right to petition the court for witnesses on the petitioners’ behalf? Do the normal CIPA provisions apply [which are quite similar to those used in the military commission proceedings] or will a future Court hold that Boumediene requires some more expansive access for detainees to personally assess and rebut extremely sensitive classified information?
In the end, after the inevitable delays caused by debate, deliberation, and development, I am hopeful that the imprimatur of Article III authority actually provides minimal substantive difference. In that event, federal habeas review will have served to validate the professionalism and patriotism of those who have sacrificed the past six years to protect America while respecting legal norms. Boumediene represents a striking reinforcement of our constitutional separation of powers; I pray that the quest to balance civil liberties does not in the end deprive our citizens of their lives or liberties.
I have been invited to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee in a hearing on June 4, 2008, entitled “Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees within the American Justice System.” I will testify regarding my proposal advocating the establishment of a domestic terror court in the US.
To watch the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Wednesday, June 4, open wwww.CapitolHearings.org
Click on Room number Dirksen 226 from the scrolling list to the right of the screen to begin streaming audio.
The executive summary of my testimony appears below. Click here to read the full text of the prepared testimony.
Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees within the American Justice System
(Executive Summary)
Considering how to handle terror detainees within the American justice system, there are three forum options: (1) treaty-based international terror courts, (2) traditional Article III courts, and (3) a hybrid option which I call “domestic terror courts.” This testimony discusses the feasibility of each forum and recommends domestic terror courts as the practical solution to detainee policy, as a legal regime for the trials of those detained post-9/11.
In response to the Supreme Court decision, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006), I have developed a model that enables the trying of terrorists while meeting judicial scrutiny by drawing on certain elements of the criminal law process. Incorporating elements of the American criminal law and criminal procedure paradigm, and drawing on the Israeli two-tiered system for the trying of terrorists, this testimony offers the forum of the domestic terror courts as a concrete recommendation for how to handle detainees post-Hamdan.
Furthermore, the testimony addresses the limits of the applicability of the criminal law process, particularly with respect to the right of detainees to confront their accusers. Detainee trials are largely based on intelligence sources whose identity cannot be disclosed. The lack of disclosure prevents full implementation of the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.
Ultimately, my model balances the defendant’s basic rights with equally legitimate national security considerations. Therefore, the domestic terror court option is the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding that some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national security, and awareness that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality.
On May 15, I will speak before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment.
The hearing is titled “The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence Should Empower America to Prepare for, Prevent, and Withstand Terrorist Attacks.”
The hearing will convene at 10:00 a.m. EST in 311 Cannon House Office Building.
The executive summary of my testimony appears below.Click here to read the full text of the prepared testimony.
The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence Should Empower America to Prepare for, Prevent, and Withstand Terrorist Attacks (Executive Summary)
To ensure a resilient homeland in a post-9/11 society, the United States must have a homeland security strategy that (1) understands the threat, (2) effectively counters the threat while preserving American values, (3) establishes a system of accountability, and (4) creates public-private and federal-state partnerships facilitating intelligence sharing and the continuity of society in the aftermath of an attack.
It is necessary to work with clear definitions of the terms and concepts that frame this strategy for resiliency. As I have previously articulated, “one of the greatest hindrances to a cogent discussion of terrorism and counterterrorism has been that the terms lack clear, universal definitions.” For this reason, I provide clear, concrete definitions of terrorism, counterterrorism, homeland security, effectiveness, accountability, and resiliency—the key terms in articulating the strategy for a resilient homeland.In addition to these definitions, I include two critical matrices for: Determining Effectiveness and Implementing Accountability.
The central focus of this testimony examines the dire consequences of the break-down in communications following both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, which suggests that in order to realize resiliency in the future, it is paramount that there is clear cooperation and coordination between the public sector and the private sector.Effective resiliency will ultimately be tied to establishing public-private partnerships.
In establishing these partnerships, they must be based upon three critical components: (1) clearly defined roles and responsibilities; (2) articulating a coordinated prevention-response plan; and (3) repeated training and/or simulation exercises using the prevention-response plan against realistic disaster/terror scenarios.By strategically strengthening security, sharing intelligence, and creating plans for post-attack procedures (such as evacuation plans, transportation plans, establishing places of refuge, and having basic supplies available to aid first-responders) private partners become the key to a secure and resilient homeland.
The importance of information before, during and after a disaster or attack is vital to resilience. Information sharing is, perhaps, the single most important aspect of successful resilience. Information sharing requires government agencies (federal, state and local) to share information both amongst themselves and with the private sector. Furthermore, it requires that the private sector—subject to existing legal and constitutional limits—share information with the public sector. Successful information sharing requires cooperation and coordination both internally (within sectors) and cross sectors (between public-private entities).
The lessons of 9/11 and Katrina speak for themselves. Resilience in the aftermath of either disaster or attack requires federal, state and local government agencies to understand that information sharing is vital to the nation’s homeland security. That information sharing process must include the private sector. Otherwise, the mistakes of yesterday will inevitably re-occur.
In response to President Bush’s decision to veto legislation outlawing waterboarding, Daniel C. Barr (Perkins Coie Brown & Bain) and I wrote this op-ed, Veto of Bill Banning Torture Places Interrogators in a Bind, published in today’s Salt Lake Tribune.
Abstract:
Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Pentagon’s recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital crimes such as terrorism and support of terrorism made national headlines. William Glaberson, U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. In this Debate, Professors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort of forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism.
Professor Guiora considers three forum options: treaty-based international terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a hybrid option he calls domestic terror courts. Ultimately, Professor Guiora argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being able to balance the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. He considers this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding that some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national security, and an awareness that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality.
Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees has been misguided, but does not believe that innovations of the sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary. Rather, he suggests that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fallback option. Professor Parry points to research that shows that the federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in federal court, and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article III courts to be solution[s] in search of a problem. Professor Parry realizes that trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist, and concludes that, [f]or people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice.
AIDP members and others interested in international criminal law are invited to participate in the AIDP American National Section’s “World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing” to be held at Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio on April 9-11, 2008.
Organized by an international program committee chaired by Case Law Professor (former Counsel to the IMF) Richard Gordon, the Terrorism Financing Conference is part of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal (AIDP)’s three-day Preparatory Colloquium for its XVIIIth International Congress of Penal Law. The first day (April 9) and third day (April 11) of the Preparatory Colloquium will consist of an expert’s meeting of foreign and American members of the AIDP, who will be debating and finalizing a resolution to be adopted at the World Congress in Istanbul in September 2009. The second day (April 10) will be a symposium open to the public, featuring panels on:
•· charities regulation and terrorism financing;
•· civil liberties considerations in creating lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations;
•· identification by financial institutions of suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing; and
•· the future of international cooperation in stopping terrorism financing.
The confirmed Conference speakers include: Carlos Eduardo Japiassu (former Secretary General of the International Association of Penal Law), Sue Eckert (formerly Assistant US Secretary of Export Administration), Rick Small (formerly Associate Director of the Federal Reserve System and Managing Director of Global Anti-Money Laundering at Citigroup), Jeff Breinholt (Deputy Chief, Counter-Terrorism Section of DOJ), Hermann Krull (Formerly Chief of Global Compliance, Standard Bank, Johannesburg, South Africa), Jean-Francis Thony (formerly Assistant General Counsel, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, IMF), Jack Smith (Basel Institute on Governance), Rick McDonnell (Head of Secretariat, Financial Action Task Force, Paris), Emile van der Does de Willebois (The World Bank), Richard Barrett (UN al Qaeda Monitoring Team), Bruce Zagaris (Center for Strategic and International Studies), and Peter Csonka (Council of Europe, Dept of Crime Problems).
For those of you who can’t make it to Cleveland for the Terrorism Financing Conference, the webcast will be available for subsequent viewing at any time at: http://law.case.edu/lectures/ .
DoD has announced today that charges have been sworn against six detainees alleged to have been involved in the September 11th attacks.
Swearing of Charges- The cases have been sworn as capital cases and have been sworn collectively (e.g. all six will be on trial at once as co-conspirators). The new courtroom which is complete and will be operational in March has six defense tables and three prosecution tables, so the facilities can accomodate this number of defendants and counsel. Also, the new courtrooms have a glass wall which will allow the court to mute any discussion of classified information, but observers will still be able to observe what the parties are doing. This is similar to the international tribunals in the Hague with the exception that those international tribunals feature a steel wall which is lowered during the discussion of classified information, preventing observers from even seeing the parties.
The fact that these cases have been sworn as capital does not mean that the convening authority will refer them as capital, the convening authority has the discretion to bump charges down (e.g. from capital to non-capital, but cannot bump them up). In my opinion it is probably a better idea to let KSM et.al. languish in the general population of a prison, rather than execute them so their faces can appear in martyrdom videos and Al Qaeda propaganda.
After swearing, the convening authority reviews the charges for legal sufficiency and determines whether there is reasonable belief/probable cause that the evidence the government has put forth will support the charges alleged. There is no time limit for this review. Once the convening authority concludes that there is reasonable belief the evidence supports the charges, she refers it to trial.
Referral and Trial- Once referred the detainees must be arrainged within 30 days. The trial clock also begins at referral requiring that the accused be brought to trial within 120 days from referral. The trial clock stops for delays such as motions by the defense. For example, the Khadr case was referred in early May 2007, he was arrainged on November 8, 2007, however only 28 days of the 120 day clock have been used as a result of delay requests and appeals by the defense.
CIA Interrogation Evidence- Perhaps most importantly, a senior DoD official confirmed today that NO CIA interrogation evidence will be used in these trials. Much has been made lately of the waterboarding of three detainees, not using evidence derived from these interrogations may avoid some defense challenges. Also, it is important to note that information derived from torture cannot legally be used in the proceedings given the MCA’s explicit ban on such evidence. (Not everyone agrees the MCA’s ban is explicit).
Clearly, some of the six detainees could be tried on publicly available information. For example, KSM admitted responsibility for the September 11th attacks in his CSRT. Stating “I was responsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z,”.
Appeals- If convicted all of these detainees will enjoy an automatic appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review. They also will have optional appeals to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The accused are:
1. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed- “the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks by proposing the operational concept to Usama bin Laden as early as 1996, obtaining approval and funding from Usama bin Laden for the attacks, overseeing the entire operation, and training the hijackers in all aspects of the operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
2. Walid Bin ‘Attash- “is alleged to have administered an al Qaeda training camp in Logar, Afghanistan where two of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were trained. He is also alleged to have traveled to Malaysia in 1999 to observe airport security by U. S. air carriers to assist in formulating the hijacking plan.”
3. Ramzi Binalshibh- “alleged to have lived with the Hamburg, Germany, al Qaeda cell where three of the Sept. 11 hijackers resided. It is alleged that Binalshibh was originally selected by Usama bin Laden to be one of the Sept. 11 hijackers and that he made a “martyr video” in preparation for the operation. He was unable to obtain a US visa and, therefore, could not enter the United States as the other hijackers did. In light of this, it is alleged that Binalshibh assisted in finding flight schools for the hijackers in the United States, and continued to assist the conspiracy by engaging in numerous financial transactions in support of the Sept. 11 operation.”
4. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali- “alleged to have included sending approximately $120,000 to the hijackers for their expenses and flight training, and facilitating travel to the United States for nine of the hijackers.”
5. Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi- “alleged to have assisted and prepared the hijackers with money, western clothing, traveler’s checks and credit cards. He is also alleged to have facilitated the transfer of thousands of dollars between the accounts of alleged Sept. 11 hijackers and himself on Sept. 11, 2001.”
6. Mohamed al Kahtani- “alleged to have attempted to enter the United States on August 4, 2001, through Orlando International Airport where he was denied entry. It is also alleged that al Kahtani carried $2,800 in cash and had an itinerary listing a phone number associated with Hawsawi.”
Murder, attempted murder, material support, conspiracy and spying are the charges against Omar Khadr who recently faced a military commission which heard challenges to its jurisdiction. I’ve previously blogged in detail about those charges here. As I’ve previously noted, Khadr comes from a dedicated al Qaeda family, with a family tradition of terrorism. Abdurahman Khadr, Omar’s brother boldly stated “I admit it that we are an al-Qaeda family. We had connections to al-Qaeda.” and later revealed that he had been “raised to become a suicide bomber.”
Khadr’s father Ahmad was killed in a targeted missile strike(others say in a shootout) in Pakistan. Prior to his death, Ahmad Khadr was a long time member of al Qaeda and rose to the highest levels of the al Qaeda terrorist network, commanding a region of Logar per the direct orders of Osama Bin Laden. Ahmad Khadr contributed to al Qaeda in the form of financial support and personnel assistance to further the organization’s international terrorism objectives. In particular, he encouraged his sons to join al Qaed and to carry out its work. The recently released “Book of 120 Martyrs” an al Qaeda recruiting tool states that Khadr married a Palestinian who “shared with him his march to jihad, and Allah granted them several sons who shared this long, tiresome march with him.” Omar Khadr heeded his father’s call.
Omar Khadr and his family made yearly trips to the bin Laden compound in Jalalabad Afghanistan, meeting with bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and other senior leaders. Khadr, not only met with senior leadership, he also attended various training camps learning the tradecraft of an international terrorist. He was trained to use rocket propelled grenades, rifles, pistols, hand grenades and explosives. He is alleged to have put his skills to use converting land mines to IED’s, planting IED’s along U.S. military routes of travel, and conducting surveillance against U.S. forces in preparation for future attacks.
In fact recently released footage shows Khadr making and emplacing an IED.
Also, footage from Iraq, gives us an idea of the other type of al Qaeda training which Khadr was likely to have gone through (Hat tip to BlackFive). That training shows children learning kidnapping and assasination, the type of conduct for which we wouldn’t hesitate to try a minor as an adult for in a domestic court.
Of course as readers know, Khadr concluded his al Qaeda tour of duty in a firefight on July 27, 2002, where he threw a grenade killing Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer of the 3rd Special Forces Group and partially blinding Sergeant First Class Layne Morris. In the firefight Khadr was shot four times by U.S. forces who then stepped over the bodies of their comrades to save his life. He was detained, provided medical treatment and sent to Guantanamo.
Khadr’s attorney’s make the argument that he was entitled to kill Sergeant Speer because Speer was a lawful target, and Khadr’s actions were not a war crime at the time he commited them. Furthemore, Defense lawyers and a UN representative have argued that if the U.S. tries Khadr, it will be a violation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, points which Colonel Davis, the former Chief Prosecutor took issue with in the comments here. Davis states:
1) The issue the protocol and lists of countries stating opposition to the recruitment of child soldiers does not speak to their conduct, it speaks to bans on recruitment.
2) Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child places limits on punishment, not prosecution.
3) The U.N. sanctioned Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Statue in Article 7 allowed for jurisdiction over persons 15 years of age.
Abstract:
Unlike traditional war in which soldiers fought soldiers and tanks attacked tanks, the “unseen enemy in the dark shadows of the back alleys” characterizes the post 9/11 world. Commanders are facing many challenges targeting battlefield combatants. What increasingly complicates the battlefield commanders’ dilemma in determining the status of the individual standing before him is what we describe and define in the article as “voluntary human shields”. Commanders are faced with many decision points once terrorist organizations or enemy forces introduce human shields into the equation. Battlefield commanders must determine whether the human shield is friend, foe, or innocent bystander. After making this determination, the commander then must consider the impact of potential civilian casualties or the perception that civilian casualties occurred. These decisions often have to be made by the commander on the ground with little to no time to contemplate the pros and cons of the decision.
We have chosen to address this issue for multiple reasons: commanders demand clear criteria regarding the status of those in the “zone of combat”; the innocent civilian must be protected; international law demands the soldier be trained in distinguishing between the innocent and non-innocent and the community supporting terrorist organizations must know that the truly innocent will be protected (to the greatest extent possible). The security of those individuals on the battlefield depends on the analysis of the commander. The commander must assess the security rights of the individuals on the field of battle (guided by international humanitarian law) versus the security of the soldiers he commands and the security of the state he represents. The commander needs tools to toss into his proverbial pack to take with him on the battlefield. In the article, we assert the “tools” must consist, at a minimum, of the following factors: 1) intelligence information; 2) analysis of the conduct of the specific individual; 3) battlefield circumstances at the relevant time; 4) the commanders’ prior experience; 5) the conduct of additional individuals in the surrounding area. Senior military commanders, policy and decision makers, academics, the general public and those supporting terrorists must address this issue. Otherwise, the killing of innocent civilians is as inevitable as the tragic death of a soldier unequipped to determine “who is the enemy”.
The AIDP is the oldest association of criminal law specialists in the world and one of the oldest scientific associations. This blog serves as a discussion site for all things law, with a focus upon criminal law, comparative criminal justice, international criminal law, international humanitarian law, war crimes, international criminal tribunals, human rights and counterterrorism law & policy.
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