http://aidpblog.org/2008/11/13/military-commissions-and-national-security-courts-after-guantanamo/ The official blog of the American National Section of the International Association of Penal Law. A discussion site for all things law, with a focus upon criminal justice policy and codification of criminal law; comparative criminal justice; international criminal law; human rights in the administration of criminal justice, and counterterrorism law & policy. Mon, 16 Nov 2009 13:28:27 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 http://aidpblog.org/2008/11/13/military-commissions-and-national-security-courts-after-guantanamo/comment-page-1/#comment-3696 caselaw Mon, 09 Feb 2009 00:35:17 +0000 http://aidpblog.org/?p=244#comment-3696 Creating domestic terror courts would send a message to the world that the United States is putting a serious process in place. See The Case for a National Security Court available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200702u/nj_taylor_2007-02-27. Because evidence in a domestic terror court trial likely contains confidential intelligent information, it is important to recognize the difference between a “denial of rights” and a legal system without absolute detainee rights. However, indefinite detention of detainees is certainly not advancing national security interests and would be potentially disastrous for the United States and its Constitution. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 252 (Jul. 2008). The first few months of the Obama administration will re-shape the eight years of President Bush’s policy for enemy combatants. Will the Obama administration endorse detention based on unreliable intelligence information? A better way to ensure balanced rights of detainees is to reverse select policies, such as a rule in the Manual for Military Commissions that permits detainment on the basis of hearsay evidence. See William Branigan, Pentagon Sets Rules for Detainee Trials, Washington Post (Jan. 18, 2007). As a result, bench trials in a type of re-structured FISA court without a “jury of peers” would become increasingly legitimate. There are many advantages in creating a domestic terror court system. First, the burden on ordinary civilian courts is reduced. Second, the maintenance of a permanent defense staff can uphold Congressional intentions to balance the rights of detainees. Lastly, the judges in a domestic court system would be able to gain the trustworthiness of the government and defense lawyers appearing before them regularly. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, The New York Times (July 11, 2007). With the arrival of the Obama administration, there is no better time than now to put past and present discussions on detainee rights into legal practice. In doing so, a new domestic terror court system must aim to keep cases premised on intelligence at a minimum in order to avoid constant criticism. Creating domestic terror courts would send a message to the world that the United States is putting a serious process in place. See The Case for a National Security Court available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200702u/nj_taylor_2007-02-27. Because evidence in a domestic terror court trial likely contains confidential intelligent information, it is important to recognize the difference between a “denial of rights” and a legal system without absolute detainee rights. However, indefinite detention of detainees is certainly not advancing national security interests and would be potentially disastrous for the United States and its Constitution. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 252 (Jul. 2008).
The first few months of the Obama administration will re-shape the eight years of President Bush’s policy for enemy combatants. Will the Obama administration endorse detention based on unreliable intelligence information? A better way to ensure balanced rights of detainees is to reverse select policies, such as a rule in the Manual for Military Commissions that permits detainment on the basis of hearsay evidence. See William Branigan, Pentagon Sets Rules for Detainee Trials, Washington Post (Jan. 18, 2007). As a result, bench trials in a type of re-structured FISA court without a “jury of peers” would become increasingly legitimate.
There are many advantages in creating a domestic terror court system. First, the burden on ordinary civilian courts is reduced. Second, the maintenance of a permanent defense staff can uphold Congressional intentions to balance the rights of detainees. Lastly, the judges in a domestic court system would be able to gain the trustworthiness of the government and defense lawyers appearing before them regularly. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, The New York Times (July 11, 2007).
With the arrival of the Obama administration, there is no better time than now to put past and present discussions on detainee rights into legal practice. In doing so, a new domestic terror court system must aim to keep cases premised on intelligence at a minimum in order to avoid constant criticism.

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