View my essay, Military Commissions and National Security Courts after Guantanamo, Northwestern Law Review, Colloquy, 2008, written in response to Gregory S. McNeal’s article, Beyond Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options.
Abstract:
In the aftermath of 9/11, definitional uncertainty as to the status and rights of detainees has contributed to unending violations of civil and political rights for thousands of individuals held world-wide either directly by, or on behalf of, the United States. While various terms have been used to label detainees including “enemy combatant,” “illegal belligerent,” and “enemy belligerent,” all fail to define the rights such individuals should be granted. Admittedly, this process has been made more difficult by a continued inability–perhaps unwillingness– to define the conflict in a consistent manner. Is this a war? Is this a “war on terror”? Is this police action? Considering this definitional uncertainty, the critical question becomes where to appropriately try these detainees–how to try these individuals while protecting classified intelligence and also maintaining individual rights.
In this essay, I propose that detainees are neither prisoners of war nor criminals in the traditional sense; rather they are a “hybrid” of both. To that end, I recommend that the appropriate term for post 9/11 detainees is “individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism.” This definition adopts aspects of both the prisoner of war and criminal law paradigms, thereby creating what I have called a “hybrid paradigm.” The hybrid paradigm seeks to balance–or maximize–the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. Furthermore, it seeks to move beyond the amorphousness that has defined much of the debate over the last seven years.
To try these individuals, I suggest a hybrid “domestic terror court” that would allow for an in camera review of confidential intelligence information presented by the prosecutor and a representative of the intelligence services. A properly constituted domestic terror court–comprised of judges schooled in understanding intelligence reports and intelligence gathering procedures, and aware of the necessity of preserving constitutional rights–is the proper starting point in moving forward with post 9/11 terrorist prosecutions. The proposed hybrid paradigm will ensure both the state’s obligations to keep intelligence and matters of national security confidential as well as the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Cross-posted in National Security Advisors.
Comment #1
caselaw said,
Creating domestic terror courts would send a message to the world that the United States is putting a serious process in place. See The Case for a National Security Court available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200702u/nj_taylor_2007-02-27. Because evidence in a domestic terror court trial likely contains confidential intelligent information, it is important to recognize the difference between a “denial of rights” and a legal system without absolute detainee rights. However, indefinite detention of detainees is certainly not advancing national security interests and would be potentially disastrous for the United States and its Constitution. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 252 (Jul. 2008).
The first few months of the Obama administration will re-shape the eight years of President Bush’s policy for enemy combatants. Will the Obama administration endorse detention based on unreliable intelligence information? A better way to ensure balanced rights of detainees is to reverse select policies, such as a rule in the Manual for Military Commissions that permits detainment on the basis of hearsay evidence. See William Branigan, Pentagon Sets Rules for Detainee Trials, Washington Post (Jan. 18, 2007). As a result, bench trials in a type of re-structured FISA court without a “jury of peers” would become increasingly legitimate.
There are many advantages in creating a domestic terror court system. First, the burden on ordinary civilian courts is reduced. Second, the maintenance of a permanent defense staff can uphold Congressional intentions to balance the rights of detainees. Lastly, the judges in a domestic court system would be able to gain the trustworthiness of the government and defense lawyers appearing before them regularly. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, The New York Times (July 11, 2007).
With the arrival of the Obama administration, there is no better time than now to put past and present discussions on detainee rights into legal practice. In doing so, a new domestic terror court system must aim to keep cases premised on intelligence at a minimum in order to avoid constant criticism.
February 8, 2009 at 7:35 pm